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LIFTING THE FLOOR: SEX, CLASS, AND EDUCATION 
. . 
By: Naomi Cabn and June Carbone 
Third-wave feminism emphasizes the possibilities that come with choice. Women can choose to be wives, mothers, employees, 
bosses, hobos, harlots, veiled Islamists, semi-observant Catholics, 
provocateurs of any stripe, in mix or match settings in which no role 
necessarily excludes any other, or permanently defines the women 
occupying it. As third-wave feminists celebrate the possibility of 
choice, however, it is critical to ground this option in the class 
perspective that is an integral part of the third-wave itself; otherwise, 
third-wave feminism risks diminishing the prospects for solidarity 
with a working class that might happily trade the illusion of choice for 
more rigidly defined structures that offer the prospect of greater 
support. Third-wave feminism recognizes the importance of "raising 
the floor,,,l and this paper - from two second-wave feminists - helps 
in developing an agenda for achieving that goal. 
Integrating a class analysis into feminism is not new, of course; 
many second-wave feminists, while concerned with male/femalf; 
equality, also sought to ensure that feminism did not exclude poor and 
working-class women. Barbara Ehrenreich, for example, has written 
eloquently about "making ends meet.,,2 Theda Skocpol, Frances Fox 
Piven, and Gwendolyn Mink have called our attention to the impact of 
3 
welfare on women. 
In this paper, we approach class issues through the lens of family 
law, examining how a state's approach to issues of family leave and 
contraception affects class mobility. Indeed, the "culture wars," as 
they play out in high profile Supreme Court decisions and legislative 
• Naomi Cahn is the John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, GWU Law School; 
June Carbone is the Edward A. SmithlMissouri Chair of Law, the Constitution and Society, 
University of Missouri-Kansas City. 
1 JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMy RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG WOMEN, FEMINISM, 
AND THE FUTURE 82 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2000). 
2 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMEO: ON (NOT) GETTING By IN AMERICA 220-21 
(Henry Holt and Co., LLC 2001). 
3 GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S ENDS 8 (Cornell University Press 1998); FRANCES Fox 
PIVEN, Welfare and Work, in WHOSE WELFARE? 97 (Gwendolyn Mink ed., Cornell University 
Press 1999); THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE FUTURE OF 
AMERICA SOCIAL POLICY 13 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2000). 
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fights over abortion and same-sex marriage, are first and foremost 
about family values. Family values in the United States are not 
unitary; different families in different parts of the country are leading 
different lives. A new family culture has emerged among middle class 
men and women that is geared for the post-industrial economy. With 
fertility rates dropping and the average age of marriage moving into 
the late twenties, states deregulate sexuality, identify responsibility 
with financial independence, respect equality and autonomy, and 
safeguard access to contraception and abortion for teens and adults. 
Middle class men and women reap the benefits. 
This new culture, in both its feminist and non-feminist iterations, 
fetishizes choice. It does so because it is grounded in a socialization 
that makes the exercise of autonomy - and the transfer of 
responsibility for investment in human capital from institutions to 
individuals - foundational to middle-class life. The centerpiece of 
the cultural reorganization is the emergence of the twenties as a period 
of exploration of jobs, career possibilities, relationships, and gender 
roles and attributes, with the deferral of irrevocable choices and 
permanent responsibilities until the far more mature - and financially 
independent - thirties. 
With greater autonomy and fewer unacceptable pathways, 
however, comes less societal support for any course of action. 
Traditionalists, who bemoan loss of the insistence on societally 
approved pathways emphasizing abstinence, marriage, and the gender 
roles that made early marriage universal and enduring, have launched 
something of a counterattack. Rooted in more religious, rural and 
conservative communities, they play on feelings of moral crisis to 
promote a "values" agenda that celebrates chastity and pumps 
government money into marriage promotion programs. Largely 
invisible in the political reaction to their efforts, however, is the fact 
that their embrace of more traditional values - one more acceptable 
choice among many - in fact dramatically restricts the avenues open 
to the most disadvantaged Americans, and further blocks any hope of 
progress into the increasingly hard to attain status of middle-class life. 
The critical moral issues that divide the two systems of family law 
- issues such as abstinence education, abortion, and gay relationships 
- center on control of sexuality, particularly female sexuality. If, as 
Professor Bridget Crawford notes, one of the challenges of third-wave 
feminism, is "to develop an account of the law's ability to enhance 
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women's autonomy and well-being,,,4 then the blue state model is 
radical because it allows women to control their own sexuality. On 
the other hand, the emphasis in third-wave feminism on autonomy and 
choice may obscure the restriction of choice for those without the 
means to secure autonomy. Indeed, the very acceptance of traditional 
values as within the ambit of permissible options may have muted 
political opposition to abstinence and marriage programs, obscuring 
their role in making contraception and abortion less available to poor 
women. The resulting increase in teen births and single mothers, all 
within the realm of permissible practices, then becomes identified only 
with conservative concerns. The role of moralistic restrictions and 
government budget cuts in engineering the increase in unplanned 
pregnancies disappears from view. Yet, genuine autonomy and choice 
for both men and women depend on the ability to secure educational 
opportunities and control fertility. Early births to impoverished women, 
who are disproportionately likely to be victims of sexual coercion and to 
lack support from family or mates, derail education, and lock single 
mothers into marginal positions unlikely to provide opportunities for the 
work-life balance available to more highly educated women. 
After a brief exploration of these two models, this paper makes 
two critical points: (1) it correlates the different models to the varying 
approaches to parental leave laws; and (2) expands our discussion of 
women and care beyond the workplace and child care, exploring what 
contributes to women's ability to care for their children and others: 
education, an outcome that is associated with deferred childbearing 
and higher income in the newer family model. It is in looking at the 
impact of education that we can get at some of the variations within 
each model based on class and race. Our conversation about third-
wave feminism must examine women's means of moving between 
classes and being able to provide better care to themselves and to 
others (whether it be children or parents or significant others). 
Moreover, educating women serves to challenge gendered stereotypes 
and is another means for putting pressure on others to help with the 
care-work. 
I. DIFFERENT F AMIL Y MODELS 
Third-wave feminism's most pressing challenge may be the effort 
to combine its celebration of "choice" - the ideal of elites - with 
renewed attention to economic inequality and the construction of class. 
4 Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, 
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. 1. GENDER & L. 99, 168 (2007). 
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The first part of the challenge comes from the fact that an insistence 
on autonomy may reflect the needs of the new information economy 
as much as an authentic feminist perspective. The second is the risk 
that the new middle class model that makes women's greater 
autonomy realistic may simultaneously undermine the ability of 
working class women to realize the promises of middle class life. 
These contradictions may lay the groundwork for something that may 
ultimately define the third-wave, viz., a renewed political and legal 
conSClOusness. 
Underlying these contradictions is tension in the United States 
between the two different family systems that guide the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood. In the older, more traditional system, the 
entry into adulthood corresponded with the assumption of adult roles 
- marriage, childbearing, and employment. The new system, which 
we have termed "the new middle class morality," identifies adulthood 
with financial independence and emotional maturity. This system 
corresponds to the needs of the information economy. Employment 
has become less secure. With greater turnover, employers invest less 
in training new workers. The new pathway to the middle class 
emphasizes adaptability; too early an assumption of permanent 
commitments may derail better opportunities later. The twenties have 
accordingly become a time of education, internships, skill acquisition, 
job transitions, and serial relationships.s The results pay off handsomely 
for family formation in the thirties. Dual career families earn more and 
enjoy more of a cushion that allows them to weather financial adversity. 
Moreover, the new patterns produce more independent women, who can 
more successfully demand and find companionate mates.
6 
College 
educated women are the only group in society whose marriage rates 
have increased, and the marriages they enter are as stable as the unions 
of the mid-1960s, the period before no-fault divorce, the legalization of 
abortion, or widespread use of the pill. 
A distinguishing feature of the new middle class model is delay in 
childbearing. The average age of first birth for the country as a whole 
has risen from 21.4 in 1970 to 25.2 in 2004, what Elizabeth Gregory 
7 
terms "an enormous change." For college-educated women, the 
average age of first birth is 30.1.
8 
Within such a model, "responsible" 
S See June Carbone, Age Matters: Class, Family Formation, and Inequality, 48 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 901, 954, 958 (2008). 
6 ELIZABETH GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE NEW, LATER 
MOTHERHOOD 8-9 (Basic Books 2007). 
7 Jd. at 2-3. 
8Id. 
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reproduction follows financial independence and emotional maturity. 
Contraception is accordingly an imperative, and abortion an important, 
if regrettable, backup. 
The legal correlates of this model - greater access to 
contraception and abortion, equality and autonomy for women, 
tolerance for sexuality - have been most widely accepted in the 
wealthier areas of the country - urban areas, the Northeast and the 
West Coast, the upper mid-west. They are also deeply threatening to 
the more traditional and more religious areas of the country, identified 
with the core of Bush's support in the 2004 election. These "red 
states," or more accurately, the politically active RepUblicans who 
have pushed a "moral values" agenda, reject the new culture. They 
continue to emphasize religious teachings that celebrate the unity of 
sex, marriage, and reproduction. As a result of the emphasis on 
chastity and abstinence education for teenagers and the lesser 
availability of contraception and abortion, however, red states have 
higher teen pregnancy rates, more shot gun marriages, and lower 
average ages of marriage and first births. Not only are these, in turn, 
associated with lower income, but early marriage and shotgun 
weddings also correlate with higher divorce rates. Both divorce and 
the cognitive dissonance that comes from the lengthening period of 
time between the beginning of sexual activity and marriage in all 
states produces a sense of moral crisis that in tum fuels political 
support for abstinence education, marriage promotion, and further 
restrictions on access not only to abortion, but contraception. The 
result increases the likelihood of early pregnancy for the working class 
- teen birth rates increased in 2006 for the first time since 1991 -
and makes support for the workforce participation of young mothers 
that much more critical. 
The lack of agreement about acceptable paths to adulthood, and 
the diverging needs of the middle and working classes, complicate an 
effective political response. Welfare reform illustrates the tensions. 
The legislation and subsequent implementation efforts reflect an 
emphasis on marriage, associated with a more traditional and red state 
approach - but less than 1 % of welfare leavers did so for marriage. 
A second aspect of welfare reform, however, reflects blue state values: 
there is a strong emphasis on work. Yet welfare reform does not 
provide the necessary support for either marriage or work. It lacks the 
necessary support for helping men find employment, and it does not 
provide adequate attention for either training women for better jobs 
nor for facilitating mothers' participation in a family unfriendly labor 
market. 
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II. THE IMPACT ON CARE 
The need to balance work and family affects men and women 
regardless of class. Through the Federal Family and Medical Leave 
Act ("FMLA"), all workers who satisfy certain criteria, such as size of 
employer and length of time at employment, are guaranteed at least 
twelve weeks of unpaid family and medical leave.
9 
This section 
addresses patterns of the FMLA usage as well as the various ways in 
which states have supplemented the federal leave guarantees. As this 
discussion shows, not only are poor women less likely to have access 
to leave and related balancing benefits, but also, blue states are far 
more likely to have enacted legislation that protects the work family 
balance. 
A. Class and Care: 
The care picture is complicated by limits in FMLA coverage, the 
inability to take unpaid leave, and access to paid leave. First, almost 
40% of employees are not at worksites subject to the FMLA,1O and 
because not all of those employees have satisfied the prerequisites, 
only 54% of the workforce is eligible to take FMLA leave. II Second, 
even among those workers who are covered, many (according to one 
study, more than three-quarters) cannot take the leave because they 
cannot afford to take unpaid leave. 12 
Third, although FMLA leave is unpaid, some employees do have 
access to paid leave. Approximately 40% of working parents earning 
less than 200% of the federal poverty level have no access to paid 
leave at all (no paid sick days, vacation, nor personal days).13 Among 
9 An employee eligible for leave under the FMLA must be employed for at least "12 
months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this 
title; and for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month 
period." 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2) (2008). The FMLA only applies to employers who employ "50 
or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year." ld. at § 2611(4). Assuming an employee is eligible 
for leave under the FMLA and works for an employer covered by the FMLA, the employee 
shall be entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave. Jd. at § 2612(a)-(c). 
10 JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER & NIRALI PATEL, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE BY STATE 
ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 7 (2005) [hereinafter Expecting Better], available 
at http://www.nationalpartnership.orgisitelDocServer/ParentaILeaveReportMay05.pdf?doclD 
=1052. 
II Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of Labor's 
Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550, 35622 (June 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/esa!whdIFMLA2007Reportl2007FinaIReport.pdf. 
12 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 7. 
13 ld. at 8. 
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low wage workers, 76% do not have access to paid sick leave.
14 
Indeed, as a general matter, low wage workers are less likely than 
higher-income workers to be covered by family leave policies, to be 
eligible to take even unpaid family leave, or, much less, to receive 
paid family leave. 15 They are also less likely to have access to flexible 
scheduling. 16 
While highly educated and higher income women are more likely 
to have access to paid leave than women with less education and lower 
incomes, still one-third of those highly educated and higher income 
women lack access to any form of paid maternity leave. In fact, 35% 
of highly educated women are forced to take unpaid maternity leave, 
compared to 47% of women who have less than a high school 
education who must take unpaid maternity leave.
17 
Women with a 
college degree were three times more likely to take paid leave 
following the birth of their first child (58.7%) than women with less 
than a high school education (17.8%); while 56.4% of women with 
less than a high school education took unpaid leave, only 38.6% of 
women with a college degree used unpaid leave. 18 Moreover, women 
in blue states have better health care coverage. The five states with the 
lowest rate of uninsured women are all blue - Hawaii (11.2%), 
Minnesota (11.5%), Massachusetts (11.9%), Maine (12.1 %), and Iowa 
(12.9%).19 
B. Who Cares? 
The work and family balance that makes it possible for women to 
remain in the workplace is more critical to the newer model - and to 
14 Id. at 8. 
15 "In March 2005, 54% of workers who made more than $15 per hour had access to a 
short-term disability policy, while only 28% of workers earning less than $15 per hour had 
access to a short-term disability policy. Similarly, 46% of workers who made over $15 per 
hour had access to long-term disability leave, while only 16% of workers making less than 
$15 per hour had access to long-term disability leave. There are similar disparities in access 
to paid sick leave and paid holidays. Eighty-eight percent of workers making more than $15 
per hour had access to paid holidays, and 75% of these workers had access to paid sick leave. 
Meanwhile, 68% of workers earning less than $15 per hour had access to paid holidays, and 
only 47% had access to paid sick leave." Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Law Left Out 
Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1,8 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
16 Joan C. Williams, One Sick Child Away from Being Fired: When "Opting Out" is Not 
an Option 8 (2006), http://www.uchastings.edulsite_filesIWLLlonesickchild.pdf. 
17 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 7-8. 
18 JULIA O. JOHNSON & BARBARA DOWNS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MATERNITY LEAVE 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961-2000, 11 tbl.7 (2005), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prodl2005pubs/p70-1 03. pdf. 
19 KAISER FOUNDATION, MEDICAID'S ROLE IN FAMILY PLANNING 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.kff.orglwomenshealthluploadl7064 _03. pdf. 
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the autonQIllY of poorer women. Through a series of different laws -
ranging from domestic violence protection in the workplace to paid leave 
- some states (typically, those that voted Democratic in the 2004 
election and are viewed as "blue states") are generally more hospitable to 
working women who have families. The National Partnership on 
Women and Families examined a series of different laws in developing a 
state by state scorecard of parental leave programs. Several states -
California, Minnesota, and Washington (all blue) - have enacted paid 
family leave legislation, and a series of others - all blue - have 
considered it.
20 
More generally, with respect to a series of parental leave, 
maternity benefits, and job protection for both state and private sector 
employees, the top states are: California, Hawaii, Oregon, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Washington, Maine, Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island; 
the bottom states of the bottom nineteen, only three (Delaware, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania) are blue.
21 
Those states that have most 
consistently embraced the new family model really do support care. 
III. CLASS, EDUCATION, AND CARE 
Given the class variations in access to needed care, how do we, in 
the words of Manifesta,22 move up the floor? It is important to 
recognize here that care consists not just of spending time with 
children; it also means how you care for children - are your children 
going to get a good education, experience abuse, live in stable 
housing, etc. 
Education and teen birth matter when it comes to resources for 
caring for children even outside of the workplace. Not that poverty is 
necessarily bad for children - moms can be caring and poor. 
However, life is much harder. In the international development 
literature, it is well-known that every dollar spent on a woman's 
education benefits her and her children, while every dollar spent on a 
man does not. 23 
20 See NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, STATE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS 
(2006), http://www.ncsl.orglprograms/employ/fmlachart.htm. 
21 Expecting Better, supra note 10, at 5, 15-43, 48-49. The Report evaluated states based 
on a variety of programs, including family leave benefits, medicaUmatemity leave benefits, 
flexible sick days. Id. at 12-14. 
22 BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note l. 
23 See Franz Brotzen, Economist Backs Recommitment to World Development Goals, RICE 
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.media.rice.edulmediaiNewsBot.asp?MODE=VlEW&IO= 
10207; INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV., WOMEN available at http://www.ifad.orgipub/factsheeti 
womenlwomen_e.pdf("The imbalance between the essential roles of women and their limited 
opportunities is undermining efforts to reduce poverty."); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
TASK FORCE ON EDUC. AND GENDER EQUALITY, Toward Universal Primary Educ.: 
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Let's look at women's education and poverty and the class of their 
children. First, only 36% of women with less than a high school 
degree worked during their first pregnancies, while 83% of women 
with a college degree were in the workforce. 24 Second, education 
allows parents to provide more resources for children. While the 
resources available for the average child have decreased, they have 
increased dramatically for those who are living the life of the new 
middle class morality.25 According to Princeton professor Sara 
McLanahan, 
Children who were born to mothers from the most-advantaged backgrounds 
are making substantial gains in resources. Relative to their counterparts 40 
years ago, their mothers are more mature and more likely to be working at 
well-paying jobs. These children were born into stable unions and are 
spending more time with their fathers. In contrast, children born to mothers 
from the most disadvantaged backgrounds are making smaller gains and, in 
some instances, even losing parental resources. Their mothers are working 
at low-paying jobs. Their parents' relationships are unstable, and for many, 
support from their biological fathers is minimal. 26 
Women without a college degree are almost twice as likely to get 
divorced as women with a college degree.
27 
In 2004, women with a college degree earned an average monthly 
income of $2,851.00, while women with a high school education 
earned less than half - $1,357.00. More highly educated women 
earned even more - $4,837.00.
28 
Men with comparable degrees of 
education exhibited the same pattern, although their earnings were 
higher. Access to college is an important commodity for middle class 
earning potential. Among mothers, the more highly educated women 
have higher labor force participation rates. 29 In 2004, the labor force 
investments, incentives, and institutions, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.unmillennium 
project.orgidocumentslEducation -part I .pdf 
24 JOHNSON & DOWNS, supra note 18, at 5 fig. I. 
25 See June Carbone, is Fertility the Unspoken issue in the Debate Between Liberal and 
Conservative Family Values?, 32 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 809, 822 (2007) (reviewing LINDA C. 
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
(The Harvard President and Fellows 2006)). 
26 SARA McLANAHAN, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second 
Demographic Transition 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608 (2004). 
27 See id. at 613 fig.4. 
28 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME BY EDUCATION, SEX, AGE, AND 
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2004, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION, tb1.2B 
(released January 29, 2008), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/ 
sipp2004w2.html. 
29 HEATHER BOUSHEY, ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT? DEBUNKING THE MYTH, CENTRE FOR 
ECON. POLICY RESEARCH 10 (2005), available at http://www.cepr.netldocuments/publications/ 
opt_out_2005 _ll_2.pdf. 
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participation rate for mothers with less than a high school education 
was 28.8%; for women with graduate degrees, it was 77%. These 
differences held true even for mothers of children under the age of six; 
18.2% of women with less than a high school education were in the 
labor force, compared to 73.2% of women with graduate degrees. 
Perhaps even more significantly, economist Heather Boushey found 
that the "child penalty," the effect of having a child on labor force 
participation rates, is negligible for highly educated women, while it is 
considerable for women with less education. Employment rates for 
women with less education who had children at home were 21.7% less 
than for those women with the same education who did not have 
children at home, while for women with a graduate degree, the 
"penalty" rate was 1.3%. 
30 
So how do race and class play out? We hypothesize that blue laws 
reinforce the blue family lifestyle, and red laws reinforce the red 
family lifestyle; and that, at least in blue states, the blue lifestyle is 
associated with the middle class. This, in turn, is associated with 
education. According to Sara McLanahan, women with higher 
education levels have much higher incomes: in 2000, for example, 
their median family incomes were close to $80,000 per year, while 
women with less education had median family incomes of about 
$25,000 per year;31 and mothers with high levels of education are more 
than two times as likely to be employed as are mothers with low 
education (62% versus 30%). Women with low education levels were 
more than twice as likely to become single mothers than women with 
higher education; women with a four-year degree had a divorce rate of 
about 17% in 2000, while women without a four-year degree had a 
divorce rate almost double, at about 32%. Moreover, earlier 
childbearing is associated with less education. Almost 60% of teens 
with a school-age pregnancy drop out of high school, while only 25% 
of teens who do not have a child before they turn eighteen drop out of 
schooe
2 
Only 2% of teen mothers will graduate from college, while 
four times that number of women who do not have children until 
twenty or twenty-one will graduate. Eighty-two percent of children 
whose parents do not have a high school diploma live in poverty. 
Seventy-five percent of unmarried teen mothers begin to receive 
welfare within five years of their first child. Children of teen mothers 
30 See id. at 11-12 tbls.5 & 6. 
31 McLANAHAN, supra note 26, at 614. 
32 THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, WHY IT MATTERS: TEEN 
PREGNANCY AND EDUCATION, available at http://www.thenationaicampaign.org/why-it-
matters/pdfleducation.pdf. 
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do not perform as well in school as children of older mothers; for 
example, they are 50% more likely to repeat a grade. The daughters of 
teen mothers are three times more likely to become teenage mothers 
themselves as compared to daughters of mothers ages twenty and 
twenty-one. 
The blue states are beginning to learn this lesson. The five states33 
with the lowest rates of teen births are all concentrated in the 
Northeast and all voted for Kerry: New Hampshire,34 Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine. In contrast, the five states 
with the highest teen birth rates are all red and are all in the South or 
the Southwest: Texas, New Mexico, Mississippi, Arizona, and 
Arkansas.
35 
As the statistics on education and teen pregnancy show, 
teen pregnancy is associated with class and can provide a significant 
barrier to finishing high school and pursuing additional educational 
opportunities.
36 
Contraception and abortion availability would help in 
providing teens with the choices they need. 
There are, of course, complicating factors of wealth, religion, and 
ethnic diversity in reinforcing or undercutting family formation practices. 
Nonetheless, however, the fact of different cultural understandings III 
itself is a significant issue underlying family law decisions. 
33 To make the analysis more cogent, we focus on the highest and lowest five states in 
each category. 
34 New Hampshire, unlike the others, however, was so close that it could be more 
accurately described as "purple." See The Washington Post, U.S. President - New 
Hampshire (2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpsrv/elections/2004/page/ 
295035 (demonstrating the 2004 presidential election in New Hampshire was so close that it 
could more accurately be described as a "purple" state). 
35 CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, TEEN BIRTH RATES RANKED LOWEST TO HIGHEST (2003) 
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.orglpdfl13]DF.pdf In 1988, by contrast, the lowest teen 
birth rates would have in Minnesota, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont while the highest rates would have been in Mississippi, New Mexico, Arkansas, 
Texas, and Arizona. The relative changes involve a steady decline in teen birth rates in New 
England compared to stable rates in the upper Midwest. Abortion ratios, defined as the 
number of abortions for every 1000 births, complement the picture of regional variation. The 
states with the five highest ratios for teens are New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Maryland, all blue states from the New England or mid-Atlantic regions. 
The states with the lowest teen abortion ratios are Kentucky, Louisiana, Arkansas, South 
Dakota, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. With the exception of South Dakota, they are all 
Southern or border states. See GUTTMACHER INSTlT., U.S. TEEN PREGNANCY STATISTICS, 
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 11 (2006). If we were to measure 
abortion rates as opposed to ratios, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland would remain in the 
top five, but Massachusetts and Connecticut would be replaced by Nevada and California. ld. 
The lowest abortion rates would change more with the five lowest states: Utah, South Dakota, 
North Dakota, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Utah, North Dakota, and South Dakota also 
have relatively low teen pregnancy rates compared with Kentucky and West Virginia or the 
states with higher abortion ratios. 
36 McLANAHAN, supra note 26, at 614. 
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Turning to race, Black and Latino teens are still two to four times as 
likely as whites to become teen mothers. 37 Once they do, statistically 
speaking, women who became teen mothers are likely to stay out of the 
middle class.
38 
The November 2007 Pew Study asked middle and 
lower-class blacks what they think about each other in tenns of values, 
or, the "things that people view as important or their general way of 
thinking.,,39 By a two-to-one ratio, blacks said that the values of poor 
and middle class blacks have grown more dissimilar over the past 
decade; at the same time, most blacks say that the values of blacks and 
whites have grown more alike during this same time period. On a 
similar question, only about a quarter of all blacks (23%) said that 
middle class and poor blacks share "a lot" of values in common, while 
a plurality (42%) says they share some values in common; 22% say 
they share only a little in common and 9% say they share almost no 
values in common. Well-educated blacks are more likely than blacks 
with less education to say that a values gap within the black 
community has widened during the past decade. At the same time, 
however, it is blacks with lower incomes and less education who are 
most inclined to see few shared values between middle class and poor 
blacks - suggesting that the perception of differences over values and 
identity within the African American community is felt most strongly 
by those blacks at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. 40 
III. THE FUTURE? 
Lifting up the floor requires structural supports. So far, the 
attention in third-wave feminism has been on structural supports for 
equality and reproductive rights, but not on the more basic fonns of 
structural support that enable women to hold jobs where equality 
matters and to exercise reproductive rights in a context where choice is 
meaningful. While many women will not choose the middle class 
model that we have articulated, and while the trend towards later 
childbearing is problematic in its acceptance of women living "ideal 
worker" lives, this choice should be available. 
37 B.E. HAMILTON, J.A. MARTIN & SJ. VENTURA, BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2006, 
56 NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 7, 9 tb1.3 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56 _ 07.pdf. 
38 CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, TEEN BIRTHS II (2003), available at 
http://www.childtrendsdatabank.orglpdf713_PDF.pdf. 
39 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BLACKS SEE GROWING VALUE GAP BETWEEN POOR AND 
MIDDLE CLASS 3 (2007), available at http://pewsocialtrends.orgiassetslpdfIRace.pdf. 
40 Id. 
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These more basic supports involve education and training, 
healthcare that includes, but is not centered on, reproductive health, 
and support for balance in the workplace. Part of the problem may be 
that, in their reliance on individual narratives, third-wave feminists 
may not have access to the narratives of women unable to adequately 
articulate their needs.
41 
Listening to individual narratives may make it more difficult to 
engage with the larger, systemic, and more fundamental group 
problems. Indeed, third-wave feminists offer their own challenges to 
the emphasis on individual narrative, and even on the terminology 
"third-wave" and its suggested differentiation from other forms of 
feminism. Some suggest that the term itself is no longer useful; 42 
others suggest that the debate is useful in attempting 
to determine if there's enough of a generational divide between older and 
younger feminists to warrant a whole new label. The question seems to be, 
have we moved far enough from the social issues that propelled the 
women's movement in the 1960s and '70s to be able to suggest that there's 
a new wave?43 
Such questions help third-wave feminism define itself and its goals. 
Indeed, there are some self-identified third-wave feminist agendas 
that strive to make the .goals of gender equality more concrete.44 For 
example, in their thirteen-point Manifesta, Baumgardner and Richards 
include a comprehensive goal about women's involvement in the 
armed forces, calling for women who wish to do so: 
to participate in all reaches of the military, including combat, and to enjoy 
all the benefits (loans, health care, pensions) offered to its members for as 
long as we continue to have an active military. The largest expenditure of 
41 See Crawford, supra note 4, at 166 (noting that "the only autobiographical account that 
will make it into a book of third-wave feminist writing is one told by the person with enough 
education, authority, and mental and cultural resources to write it."). 
42 E.g., Lisa Jervis, The End 0/ Feminism's Third-wave, Ms. MAGAZINE, 2004, available 
at http://www.msmagazine.comlwinter2004/thirdwave.asp. 
43 Alison Piepmeier, Postfeminism vs. the Third-wave, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www. 
electronicbookreview.comlthreadlwritingpostfeminismlreconfiguredrip2. Piepmeier is the 
author of Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism/or the 21st Century (Rory Dicker & Alison 
Piepmeier, eds., Northeastern University Press 2003). 
44 Id. (noting that third-wave feminism "grapples with women's intersectional identities 
and demands an end to all the forms of oppression that keep women from achieving their full 
humanity."). See also Deborah Siegel, Women: What Next/or the Sexual Revolution?, THE 
GUARDIAN (United Kingdom), Aug. 16,2007, at 16 (suggesting that the stripping pole is to 
third-wave feminism what bra-burning was to second-wave feminists, and that third-wave 
feminists are concerned with activism on a series of gender equality issues), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uklworldl2007/augl31/gender.uk. 
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our national budget goes toward maintaining this welfare system, and 
feminists have a duty to make sure women have access to very echelon. 45 
Notwithstanding their approach to equity in the military, and their 
critique of it as a ''welfare system," there is no comparable goal with 
respect to other forms of public welfare. Indeed they make the 
following two somewhat more modest demands concerning health care: 
3. To make explicit that the fight for reproductive rights must include 
birth control; the right for poor women and lesbians to have children ... 
subsidized fertility treatments for all women who choose them; and 
freedom from sterilization abuse. Furthermore, to support the idea that sex 
can be - and usually is - for pleasure, not procreation ... 
8. To have equal access to health care, regardless of income, which 
includes coverage equivalent to men's and keeping in mind that women use 
the system more often than men do because of our reproductive capacity.46 
While gender equity in health care and in the military are 
important signposts on the road to equality, these markers do not 
provide the basic structural supports that women need to achieve the 
potential that is so celebrated. 
Instead, as we have argued elsewhere, women need to be trained 
and educated to assume their roles in the economic future. Our 
examination of how demographic differences correspond to 
differences in understandings about values (such as views on the 
regulation of sexuality or "family values"), and not just on hot button 
issues, such as same-sex marriage or parental notification of abortion, 
have resulted in our conclusion that the newer family culture is the 
system that is better geared for the post-industrial economy. The 
fundamentally religious and other "conservative" influences are 
distracting the country from developing a family law system that 
promotes economic growth and stronger families. In terms of macro 
and micro economic and social stability, the family culture (of both 
laws and life patterns) that is more typical in blue states provides a 
model for the future. Policies that promote early marriage and higher 
fertility produce less investment in each child, which in tum promotes 
a less skilled labor force, which in tum attracts a less skilled industry, 
which in tum keeps wage levels down and makes employers less 
likely to offer paid leave and other benefits. 
The conservative take on this is to re-impose values that tie 
marriage and childbearing together, pushing a solution that depends on 
45 BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 1, at 280. 
46 Id. at 279-80. 
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low income women getting married.
47 
David Blankenhorn flatly states, 
"there is something specifically about marriage that tends to boost 
earnings and reduce poverty.,,48 Federal marriage promotion efforts 
emphasize responsibility on the parts of both men and women, 
presuming that it is because both men and women are acting 
irresponsibly that the non-marital childbirth has increased so 
dramatically. If irresponsible sexual behavior is the problem, then 
enforcing marriage is the solution that not only privatizes dependence 
(solving welfare) but also benefits children. It is true that the 
overwhelming majority of public welfare recipients (69.6%) are single, 
while only 10.5% are married, and that approximately 90% of the 
recipients are female. 49 On the other hand, only 0.1% of welfare 
recipients stop receiving it because they married, while 20.9% leave 
50 
because of employment. 
While we support adult commitment, forcing people to marry is 
not the answer. Indeed, most people have a positive view of marriage, 
and want to be married.
51 
The state can help couples remain in 
marriage, albeit without coercion or forcing one fixed idea of marriage 
on all relationships - but that should not be the sole focus of 
changing patterns of dependency. 52 The problems that cause most 
single welfare recipients to receive aid will not be solved through 
47 See KAy HYMOWITZ, MARRIAGE AND CASTE IN AMERICA: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 
FAMILIES IN A POST-MARITAL AGE 30 (Ivan R. Dee 2006), available at http://www.city-
journal.org/htmVl6 _I_marriage _gap.html. 
48 DAVID J. BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 243 (2007). See also Amy Wax, 
Engines of Inequality: Class, Race, and Family Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567 (2007) 
(providing an extremely thoughtful discussion of potential reasons for the disparity in 
marriage rates by class). 
49 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families -
Active Cases, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofaicharacterIFY2006/tab22.htm. tbl.22 (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2008) (noting that from October 2005 until September 2006, 98,436 
recipients oftemporary assistance were male, while 897,876 were women). 
50 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families -
Closed Cases, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofalcharacter/FY2006/tab46.htm. tbl.46 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2008). 
51 See Alison Stein Wellner, The Marriage Habit: Baby Boomers May Have Believed in 
Free Love, But Now They're Hooked on Matrimony, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHIC FORECAST, 
March 2002, available at http://acuriousmind.typepad.comla_curious_mind/files/Forecast 
BoomMarriage. pdf. 
52 See generally, Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening 
Marriage, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 163, 177-90 (2001) (suggesting five ways for the federal 
government to promote marriage without imposing it, including improved data collection on 
divorce, and removing the marriage penalty in the income tax code). See also Elizabeth Scott, 
Marriage, Cohabitation, and the Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 225, 252-58 (arguing that marriage deserves "special" treatment, but that contracts 
within cohabitating relationships merit enforcement as well). 
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marriage. 53 Instead, education appears as a more feasible solution. 
Lack of education is highly correlated with welfare receipt: more than 
95% of all welfare recipients have twelve years of education or less, 
compared to 50% of the general population. While education does not 
guarantee that an individual will not receive public aid, it becomes 
statistically less likely with each year of post-secondary education. 54 
Consequently, a more comprehensive approach to the third-wave 
vision of moving up the floor suggests a series of different approaches 
that are designed to increase the economic independence of women 
and the financial resources available to children. Marriage is not, as 
the famous article goes, the panacea - but increasing education for 
women and resources for children together with facilitating the lives of 
parents who seek to be good parents and good workers are panaceas. 
So is allowing girls access to contraceptives, comprehensive sex 
education, and abortion. 
First, the concept of choice, that is so important in third-wave 
feminism, must be reconstructed. Regardless of issues concerning 
choice and false consciousness,55 one choice generally forecloses other 
future options. Thus, while the "choice" to become sexually active 
must be protected, of course, the choice of girls who become pregnant 
at sixteen may foreclose them from moving towards more autonomy 
because they are then statistically much less likely to have other 
choices concerning work and family. 
While cultural norms are integral to structuring women's choices, 
the law can support expanding those choices. Ultimately, policies 
must support practices that train for the autonomy that will allow 
women to decide for themselves when to have children and where to 
work 56 This means: (1) cushioning the consequences of bad early 
decisions so they are not permanently derailing to women; (2) 
deterring early childbirth through comprehensive sex education 
(encouraging responsibility and autonomy); and (3) enforcing laws 
against domestic violence and coercive sex (more autonomy). 
A second goal of third-wave feminism is gender equity. In 
addition to enacting the ERA and allowing equal access to the 
53 See generally, Vivian Hamilton, Will Marriage Promotion Work?, II J. GENDER, RACE 
& JUST. 1 (2007). 
54 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, supra note 49, at tb1.25. 
55 See Crawford, supra note 4, at 166; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: 
WHY F AMIL Y AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
56 One important question at the conference concerned which women's lives should be 
reproduced. We are not advocating one lifestyle over another; what we are advocating is that 
women have the education and support to understand their choices. 
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military,S7 this involves: (1) conceptualizing mothers' role as 
combining workforce participation and parenthood by making the 
workplace more family friendly; (2) re-conceiving the safety net to 
provide the things low income jobs are unlikely to provide including 
health care, assistance with child care (probably through universal 
preschool), and real unemployment assistance in a world where jobs 
have become less permanent, and retraining may be critical; and (3) 
improving education, specifically for low income children. 
Achieving this goal requires specific laws that, for example, 
mandate Medicaid funding for family planning (perhaps even a return 
to funding for abortion, if this becomes politically feasible). It means 
single parenthood with support - education, retraining, cycling in and 
out of the workforce. Ensuring that employment is feasible for single 
mothers involves the recognition that employers of poor· women 
cannot realistically subsidize family leave or health benefits. Ann 
O'Leary suggests, for example, that Congress provide funding for 
family leave for newly employed welfare recipients. 58 Similar funding 
could also be extended to health benefits to ensure that former welfare 
recipients have adequate access without employers assuming the full 
responsibility. Even more radically, laws could detach medical care 
from employment. 
In terms of family leave, as both second and third-wave feminists 
argue, there must be meaningful access for both men and women, 
which means requiring smaller workplaces to be covered and 
shortening the waiting period for employee eligibility - and ensuring 
that working class men buy into these roles. As third-wave feminism 
(and second-wave feminists as well) remind us, men's roles are critical 
to this enterprise, so this involves paying attention to the needs and 
futures of unemployed and working class men. OthelWise, not only 
will employers continue to hire men over women, but also women's 
domestic roles will not change. When an employer does invest in the 
individual, then the employer will also be more willing to provide 
additional benefits to get them to stay. Mandating parental leave 
makes individual jobs more expensive for employers, making them 
less likely to hire poorly educated or unskilled workers. For poor 
women, it is critical to prevent them either from being railroaded out 
of employment permanently by helping them acquire the education 
and skills necessary to move into jobs with more benefits. 
57 See BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 1. 
58 See O'Leary, supra note 15, at 60-61. 
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Ultimately, all women need training for the realization of their 
own autonomy and for gender equity. Enhancing women's workforce 
opportunities through better education will strengthen them 
economically as well as in their personal lives. The middle class 
already trains for autonomy by putting in place the necessary 
conditions for this status, including access to birth control, education, 
and delay in family formation. Middle class women who then have 
the capital to be worth more to employers can better negotiate 
employment situations that are family friendly enough to keep them in 
the workforce. 
By contrast, poorer women are not trained for autonomy and do 
not experience it; they have less access to contraception, which 
produces unplanned pregnancies that derail education and the kind of 
workforce participation that builds skills that contribute to long term 
marketability. To change this cycle, there are a series of steps that 
enhance choice and result in gender equity: more contraception, more 
abortion, more support for single parents, and the creation of pathways 
that provide for workforce participation and education after the birth 
of the first child. 
